Identifying Indicia of Extortion in Patent Troll Cases: Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp (2011 U.S. App. Lexis 15650) (Fed. Cir. 2011) by Hjelle, Lucas
Cybaris®
Volume 3 | Issue 2 Article 1
2012
Identifying Indicia of Extortion in Patent Troll
Cases: Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp (2011 U.S.
App. Lexis 15650) (Fed. Cir. 2011)
Lucas Hjelle
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cybaris® by an authorized administrator of Mitchell Hamline
Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Hjelle, Lucas (2012) "Identifying Indicia of Extortion in Patent Troll Cases: Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp (2011 U.S. App. Lexis





CASE NOTE: IDENTIFYING INDICIA OF EXTORTION IN PATENT TROLL 
CASES: EON-NET LP V. FLAGSTAR BANCORP (2011 U.S. APP. LEXIS 




I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 135 
A. Trolling for Definition.............................................................................. 135 
B. The Case Against the NPE ....................................................................... 137 
C. The Case for the NPE .............................................................................. 138 
D. The Eon-Net NPE ..................................................................................... 138 
II. HISTORY ....................................................................................................... 139 
III.  THE EON-NET V. FLAGSTAR DECISION ......................................................... 141 
A. Claim Construction .................................................................................. 141 
B. § 285 Sanctions ........................................................................................ 143 
1. Litigation Misconduct .......................................................................... 143 
2. Objectively Baseless Litigation in Bad Faith ....................................... 145 
C. Rule 11 Sanctions ..................................................................................... 147 
IV. EON-NET ANALYSIS ................................................................................. 148 
A. Reasonable Pre-Suit Investigation ........................................................... 149 
                                                                                                                                                              
†
 Lucas Hjelle J.D. Candidate 2012, William Mitchell College of Law; B.S. Electrical 
and Computer Engineering, Cornell University, May 2001.  The author 
would like to dedicate this article to his wonderful wife, whose 
indefatigable patience and support made this article (and law school) 
possible.  The author would also like to thank editor Dan Bruzzone, 
Editor-in-Chief Brian Bender, and the Cybaris® staff for their hard 
work on this article, and in making Cybaris® a success.  Lastly, the 
author would like to thank Professor Ken Port for his 
invigorating candor, sagacious insight, and interminable sense of 
humor. 
1
Hjelle: Identifying Indicia of Extortion in Patent Troll Cases: Eon-Net L
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012
[3:133 2012]   CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW 134 
 
 
B. Destruction of Evidence ........................................................................... 150 
C. Offensive Litigation Practices.................................................................. 150 
D. Indicia of Extortion .................................................................................. 151 
V. CURTAILING THE NPE .................................................................................. 151 
A. Three-Pronged Attack .............................................................................. 151 
1. Sanctions after Eon-Net ....................................................................... 152 
2. Injunctions After eBay v. MercExchange ............................................. 153 
3. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act ........................................................ 156 
B. Analysis of Attack on NPEs...................................................................... 157 




Cybaris®, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol3/iss2/1
[3:133 2012]    IDENTIFYING INDICIA OF EXTORTION 135 
IN PATENT TROLL CASES: 
EON-NET LP V. FLAGSTAR BANCORP 
 
 




A “troll” is defined as “a dwarf or giant in Scandinavian folklore inhabiting 
caves or hills.”
2
  The American Folktale “The Three Billy Goats Gruff” “includes 
one of the stock figures of the genre, a troll who exacts a toll from all those who 
seek to pass.”
3
  In this sense, a “troll” may form an appropriate simile: like bridge 
trolls, the moniker “patent troll” may appropriately characterize any entity who 
seeks to exact a toll in exchange for using a patent created by a third party.  Like 
many things pithy and memorable, this is an oversimplification: unlike a troll that 
charges a toll for using a bridge it neither built nor owns, a patent troll charges a 
toll for using products that the patent troll didn’t invent, has no intention of 
producing, or both.
4
   
A. Trolling for Definition 
Nolo defines “patent troll” as a “[d]isparaging term for someone who sues for 
patent infringement but who does not make or sell any product using the patented 
technology.”
5
  Various sources define the term more colloquially: “firms that treat 
patents as lottery tickets and file expensive, time-consuming lawsuits against 
companies that have supposedly infringed them;”
6
 or companies that “nos[e] 
around patent systems and buy[] up intellectual property, often of questionable 
quality, and us[e] it to extort money from genuinely innovative companies by 
threatening protracted and expensive legal action.”
7
 
                                                                                                                                                              
1
 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TWELFTH NIGHT act 5, sc. 1. 
2
 Troll, MERRIAM-WEBSTER: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA COMPANY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/troll (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).  Merriam Webster’s etymology of “troll” 
includes “Norwegian troll & Dan trold, from Old Norse troll giant, demon; probably akin to 
Middle High German trolle lout.” Id. 
3 
LINDA S. WATTS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN FOLKLORE  383 (2007). 
4
 MATTHEW D. ASBELL, LANNING G. BRYER & SCOTT J. LEBSON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY CORPORATION: A SHIFT IN STRATEGIC AND FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT 144 (2011). 
5
 NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY, http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/patent-troll-
term.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).  At the time of this writing, Black’s Law Dictionary did not 
contain a definition for “patent troll.” 
6
 Why America’s Patent System Needs to be Reformed, and How to do it, THE ECONOMIST, 
Aug. 20, 2011, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21526370?fsrc=scn/tw/te/ar/patentmedicine. 
7
 Tim Hartford, Taming the Patent Troll, FT MAGAZINE (Aug. 19, 2011), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/3246d5b4-c870-11e0-833c-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1ViUH4xXh. 
3
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Peter Detkin is generally accepted to have coined the phrase “patent troll.”
8
  
While assistant general counsel of Intel Corporation, Detkin initially labeled 
patent infringement plaintiffs “patent extortionists.”
9
  One such plaintiff 
responded by suing for libel, and Detkin responded by coining the term “patent 
troll.”
10
  Detkin explains the etymology of “patent troll” by alluding to Billy 
Goats Gruff: “It's someone lying under a bridge they didn't build, demanding 
payment from anybody who passed.”
11
 
Under this definition, “patent troll” may be applied to a number of mutually 
disparate entities: 
(1) [I]ndividual inventors or patent owners who do not make a 
product but seek to assert their patents against large corporations; 
(2) small think tanks who exist to think up ideas for inventions, 
patent them, and then assert or license them; (3) companies that 
seek solely to acquire patents for the purpose of asserting them and 
enforcing them in the courts if necessary; (4) universities and other 
academic institutions; (5) government research organizations; and 
(6) contract research companies.
12
 
Due to concerns over the term “patent troll” being applied unfairly to some of 
these entities, legal scholars and practitioners have devised gentler sobriquets: 
“nonpracticing entity, or NPE; patent aggregator; patent marketer; 
nonmanufacturing entity or nonmanufacturing patentee; patent dealer; patent 
enforcer or patent enforcement specialist; patent pirates; [or] patent litigation 
firm.”
13
  Manufacturing entities may be included if they “adopt a ‘patent factory’ 
approach and acquire patents covering products they are not manufacturing.”
14
  
                                                                                                                                                              
8
 See, e.g., Lisa Lerer, Meet the Original Patent Troll, LAW.COM: AN ALM WEB SITE (July 20, 
2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1153299926232&slreturn=1. 
9
 See ASBELL, BRYER & LEBSON, supra note 4, at 145.  Non-practicing entities "do not provide 
end products or services themselves, but who do demand royalties as a price for authorizing the 




 Transcript of 441: When Patents Attack!, THIS AMERICAN LIFE, (2011) 
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/transcript (last visited Feb. 21, 2012). 
12
 ASBELL, BRYER & LEBSON, supra note 4, at 145. 
13
 Id.  (formatting modified for readability). 
14
 Id.  
4
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To avoid clouding the issue with potentially emotionally charged terminology, 
this note will use the industry standard “nonpracticing entity,” or NPE.
15
 
B. The Case Against the NPE 
Though the term NPE is widely accepted, the primary criticism of NPEs is 
inherent in the name: instead of “commercializ[ing] the patented invention,” 
NPEs “generate income through aggressive licensing and litigation of their patent 
portfolios.”
16
  This is at variance with the Constitutional foundation for patent 
law: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .”
17
  Indeed, 
“because a patent troll does not add anything to the technical sophistication of 
society and their primary purpose is to extract royalties or settlements from 
others, patent trolls stifle innovation and unnecessarily burden society by 
increasing costs of goods.”
18
  While litigating lawsuits for patent infringement 
may be the “cost of doing business,” this cost is “invariably passed on to the 
consumer as higher costs for those goods.”
19
 
 There are two social policy justifications for our current patent system: a 
bilateral exchange of additions to the public domain for a limited term of 
exclusivity,
20
 and a unilateral incentive to invent.
21
  The more egregious examples 
of NPEs neither contribute to the public domain nor encourage invention, instead 
focusing exclusively on reallocation of wealth: an existing NPE may purchase 
patents cheaply with the sole intention of leveraging the patent for pretrial 
settlements or licensing revenue.
22
  While some NPEs acquire patents, some 
patents create NPEs: as with the plaintiff-appellants in Eon-Net, a group of 
                                                                                                                                                              
15
 To be certain, the term “patent troll” has enough dissenting definitions that it would be 
intellectually dishonest to attempt to finalize its definition within this brief paper.  Similarly, it 
would be disingenuous to attempt to add the term “non-inventing entity” to the literature. 
16
 ASBELL, BRYER & LEBSON, supra note 4, at 144–45. 
17
 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
18
 Brian D. Bender, Note: Tiptoeing Through the Peripheral Minefield: Why Catering to Concepts 
of Notice is Misguided, 2 CYBARIS®, AN INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 73, 102 (2011). 
19
 Id. n. 202 (quoting Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts: Let’s Build a PIT to Catch the 
Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 367, 376–77 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
20
 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:37 (4th ed. 2010).  According to this view, 
the inventor's disclosure is a significant benefit; without patenting, he or she would be able to keep 
the invention secret, thus preventing the stock of society's stock of knowledge from increasing. 
Patenting, it is felt, is an adequate price to pay for the resulting increase in public knowledge. Id. 
21
 Id. § 1:38.  “According to this reasoning, the expectation that patent rights will be available 
causes inventions to be sought after more vigorously. This increased vigor is assumed to result in a 
faster pace of invention and the creation of inventions that would otherwise not have been made.”  
Id. 
22
 ASBELL, BRYER & LEBSON, supra note 4, at 145. 
5
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patents may be allocated into interrelated subgroups, and a corporation may be 
created to hold and enforce that subgroup of patents.  These enforcement 
corporations have legal defensive and offensive advantages not afforded to 
conventional corporations: as is true of Eon-Net, NPE corporations are insulated 
from many conventional business-related counterclaims, including counterclaims 
for patent infringement, antitrust, or unfair competition.
23
 Additionally, “[a]n NPE 
often has no significant assets other than patents and has attorneys as its most 
significant employees.”
24
  As described below in Eon-Net, some of the tactical 
advantages enjoyed by NPEs have been counted among “indicia of extortion.”
25
 
C. The Case for the NPE 
It is all too easy to vilify a corporation created by an attorney for the sole 
purpose of generating revenue through lawsuits and threats of lawsuits.  However, 
supporters of NPEs point out that this financial incentive “afford[s] inventors 
leverage in licensing negotiations by providing the sizeable amount of capital that 
is needed to create a serious threat of litigation.”
26
  Couched as David versus 
Goliath, NPEs provide the most powerful weapon available to small inventors 
battling powerful corporations: financial capital sufficient to withstand expensive 
and protracted patent litigation. 
Supporters of NPEs also point out that “NPEs create a market for intellectual 
property (IP) rights, which can be inherently difficult to value.”
27
  By creating a 
market for IP rights, NPEs “allow inventors to be more readily compensated for 
their patents,” compensation which may be reapplied to subsequent inventions 
and concomitant patents.
28
  When the IP market assigns a significant value to a 
particular invention, corporations and independent inventors will be increasingly 




D. The Eon-Net NPE 
Some NPEs may spur some innovation, but the case at hand involves one of 
three NPEs created for the sole purpose of patent holding and enforcement.
30
  
                                                                                                                                                              
23
 See infra note 137 and accompanying text. 
24
 ASBELL, BRYER & LEBSON, supra note 4, at 145. 
25
 See infra notes 113–17 and accompanying text. 
26
 ASBELL, BRYER & LEBSON, supra note 4, at 146. 
27
 Id. at 145. 
28
 Id. at 145–46. 
29
 Id. at 146. 
30
 See infra note 38 and accompanying text.  While innovation and patent enforcement are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, some NPEs exist only to accumulate and enforce patents. 
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While use of the term “patent extortionist” may result in a defamation lawsuit, 
Eon-Net v. Flagstar helps us understand the metes and bounds of “indicia of 
extortion” in NPE patent infringement lawsuits.
31
 
Part II of this note describes an historical framework for Eon-Net, including a 
description of the patent family and the district court case on appeal in Eon-Net.  
Part III details the Eon-Net decision, explaining the claim construction, and 
outlining the support for § 285 and Rule 11 Sanctions.  Part IV analyzes the 
court's discussion of a reasonable pre-suit investigation, offensive litigation, and 
"indica of extortion," and how boundaries for each of these categories have 
changed as a result of this decision.  Part V analyzes the Eon-Net decision and 
two additional efforts to combat NPE abusive practices: the judicial changes in 
eBay, and the legislative changes in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.  Part 
V also analyzes the extent to which Eon-Net, eBay, and America Invents Act are 
moving the patent system closer to achieving its societal and constitutional goals.  
In Part VI, this article concludes that while these cases and legislation are a step in 
the right direction, NPEs continue to have means and motivation to continue their 
abusive practices. 
II. HISTORY 
At issue in the Eon-Net v. Flagstar decision are three U.S. patents sharing the 







(“‘673”), and 7,184,162 (“‘162”).
35
  These patents disclose a system and method 
for extracting specific information from a physical document for use in a 
computer program.
36
  These patents are members of a “larger patent family that 
issued from continuation and divisional applications of a parent patent application 
filed in 1991 (the ‘Patent Portfolio’).”
37
  The inventors listed on all three patents 
                                                                                                                                                              
31
 See infra Part III. 
32
 Eon-Net v. Flagstar, 653 F.3d 1314, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Eon-Net IV]. 
33
 Information Processing Methodology, U.S. Patent No. 6,683,697 (filed Dec. 9, 1999) (issued 
Jan. 27, 2004). 
34
 Information Processing Methodology, U.S. Patent No. 7,075,673 (filed Nov. 6, 2003) (issued 
July 11, 2006). 
35
 Information Processing Methodology, U.S. Patent No. 7,184,162 (filed Apr. 15, 2005) (issued 
Feb. 27, 2007). 
36
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d 1314, at 1317.  For example, the system may scan “portions of an invoice 
that contain the payee address or invoice amount, . . . format[] the selected information into a 
format recognized by Quicken®,” and then use Quicken® to “manipulate the information obtained 
from the hard copy documents to manage accounts, write checks, and prepare business records.”  
Id. at 1319. 
37
 Id. at 1317. 
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are principals of Eon-Net, a patent holding company formed specifically to hold 
and enforce these three patents.
38
 
In 2005, Eon-Net sued Flagstar, alleging that processing customer-entered 
website data infringed the ‘697 patent.
39
  Because Flagstar used technology 
provided by a holder of a license to ‘697, Flagstar promptly moved for summary 
judgment of noninfringement.
40
  Flagstar also moved for sanctions pursuant to 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11
41
 (“Rule 11 sanctions”), alleging “that Eon-Net failed to 
investigate or identify allegedly infringing products and that Eon-Net asserted 
baseless infringement claims.”
42
  The district court granted both summary 
judgment and Rule 11 sanctions, finding Eon-Net’s hard copy document 
processing patents inapplicable to Flagstar’s website, that Eon-Net’s claims were 
baseless, and “that Eon-Net failed to investigate or identify allegedly infringing 
products prior to filing suit.”
43
  On appeal, because the district court failed to 
allow Eon-Net to present infringement and claim construction arguments, the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded both summary 
judgment and sanctions.
44
  Eon-Net amended its complaint to include ‘673 and 
‘162,
45
 and when the court concluded the disputed patent terms applied only to 
                                                                                                                                                              
38
 Id. Eon-Net is “one of a number of patent-holding companies formed to enforce various patents 
within the Patent Portfolio.” (citing Eon-Net, L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc. (Eon-Net III), No. 
C05-2129RSM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 4, 2010) (order granting 
motion for fees and costs)) [hereinafter Eon-Net III].  The first five patents from the Patent Family 
were assigned to Millennium L.P., the ‘697, ‘673, and ‘162 patents were assigned to Eon-Net, and 
subsequent patents were assigned to Glory Licensing LLC. 
39
 Id. at 1319. 
40
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1319. 
41
 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a party to certify “that to the best of the 
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances . . . (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further 
investigation or discovery . . . .”  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).  Sanctions for Rule 11 violations “must be 
limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others 
similarly situated,” and may include “an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the 
reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation.”  FED. R. CIV. 
P. 11(c)(4). 
42
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1319 (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, *13). 
43
 Id. (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, *10–13). 
44
 Id. (citing Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 249 F. App'x 189, 198 (Fed. Cir. 2007) [hereinafter 
Eon-Net I]). 
45
 Id. (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, *20). 
8
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Following Eon-Net’s stipulation, Flagstar moved for and was granted attorney 
fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (“§ 285”).
48
  In granting Flagstar’s motion, the 
district court cited four actions by Eon-Net: pursuit of baseless infringement 
claims, improperly bringing a lawsuit to obtain a nuisance value settlement, 
destruction of evidence, and offensive litigation tactics.
49
  On invitation from the 
district court, Flagstar renewed its motion for Rule 11 sanctions.
50
  The court 
granted Rule 11 sanctions, “concluding that Eon-Net and its counsel failed to 
perform a reasonable pre-filing investigation and that their claim construction 
positions were unsupportable.”
51
  The court granted $141,984.70 in attorney fees 
and costs under Rule 11, and $489,150.48 under § 285.
52
  Eon-Net appealed the 
claim construction, the § 285 exceptional case finding, and Rule 11 sanctions.
53
   
III. THE EON-NET V. FLAGSTAR DECISION 
A. Claim Construction 
The court of appeals began by addressing claim construction de novo.
54
  Eon-
Net formed a three-part argument against the district court’s construction of the 
terms file, document, extract, and template.
55
  First, Eon-Net asserts that the 
ordinary meanings of these terms “are not limited to information derived from a 
hard copy document.”
56
  Second, Eon-Net argues the asserted claims are directed 
toward a “computer file embodiment” as disclosed in the written description.
57
  
Finally, Eon-Net cites other instances in which the United States Patent and 
                                                                                                                                                              
46
 Id. at 1320 (citing Eon-Net L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24080, *31–
35 [hereinafter Eon-Net II]). 
47
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1320. 
48
 Id. (citing Exceptional Case Order, Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *29).  In its 
entirety, 35 U.S.C. § 285 reads “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney 
fees to the prevailing party.”  See, e.g., Unilectric, Inc. v Holwin Corp. 243 F2d 393 (7th Cir. 
1957) (holding that attorney fees may be awarded in a suit for declaratory judgment of patent 
noninfringement), cert. denied 355 US 830 (1957). 
49




 Id. (citing Supplemental Order on Fees and Costs, at 6–8, Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
58784). 
52




 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1320. 
55
  Id. at 1321. 
56
  Id. 
57
  Id. 
9
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Trademark Office has allowed claims “that expressly recite that the claimed 
‘document’ or ‘file’ is ‘not derived from scanning a hard copy document,’” and 




The court of appeals disagreed with Eon-Net’s arguments.  While the court 
agreed that “claim terms should be given their ordinary and customary 
meaning,”
59
 claims must be read in the context of the specification,
60
 and that 
“usually, the specification’s use of a claim is dispositive.”
61
  Here, as the court 
pointed out, “The written description repeatedly and consistently defines the 
invention as a system that processes information derived from hard copy 
documents.”
62
  In support of its argument, the court cited passages from the 
Background of the Invention, the Summary of the Invention, and the written 
description,
63
 and that the common disclosure of the three patents includes “hard 
copy document” more than 100 times.
64
  Addressing Eon-Net’s first two 
arguments, the court found that the disputed claim terms apply to hard copy 
documents, and that Eon-Net’s argument that the terms apply to a “computer file 
embodiment” is “without merit.”
65
 
Similarly, the court of appeals disagreed with Eon-Net’s claim differentiation 
argument.
66
  First, the court pointed out that “claim differentiation is a rule of 
thumb that does not trump the clear import of the specification,” and that this 
specification defines the invention only in terms of information derived from hard 
copy documents.
67
  Second, the patents cited for claim differentiation “recite that 
the claimed ‘file’ or ‘document file’ is not derived from ‘scanning a hard copy 
document.’”
68
 Unlike the cited patents, Eon-Net’s claim language does not 
address a scope beyond information from a hard copy document: “The 
specification discloses that ‘scanning’ is only one of many methods to obtain 
information from a hard copy document . . . .”
69
  The court concluded “the 
                                                                                                                                                              
58
  Id. 
59
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1320 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)). 
60












 Id. at 1323. 
67
 Id. (quoting Edwards Lifesciences, LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
68
 Id. (citing claim 3 of U.S. Patent 7,570,383 and claim 5 of U.S. Patent 7,672,007). 
69
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1323. 
10
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specification unequivocally compels the constructions adopted by the district 
court.”
70
   
B. § 285 Sanctions 
A district court may award attorney fees under § 285 if it finds the case is 
“exceptional.”
71
  A § 285 finding is a three-step process:
72
 first, the prevailing 
party must “prove[] by clear and convincing evidence that the case is 
exceptional;”
73
 second, the court must decide whether the case warrants awarding 
attorney fees;
74
 third, the court must decide the amount of the attorney fees.
75
  
Misconduct sufficient to support an exceptional finding under § 285 may result 
from a combination of unprofessional behavior and litigation misconduct,
76
 or if 
one party “lodg[es] frivolous filings and engage[es] in vexatious or unjustified 
litigation.”
77
  Absent misconduct, a patentee may support a § 285 finding if the 
litigation was brought in bad faith and is objectively baseless.
78
  Before sustaining 




1. Litigation Misconduct 
On appeal, Eon-Net asserted it had not destroyed relevant documents.
80
  
However, Eon-Net’s principal, Mitchell Medina, testified that because Eon-Net 
and Millennium
81
 have “evolved into patent enforcement companies which are 
involved in the business of litigation,” they “have adopted a document retention 
policy which is that we don't retain any documents . . . .”
82
  Despite having other 




 Id. at 1323. 
72
 See id. at 1323–24 (the case lists this as a two-step process, but then clarifies that the amount of 
the award is determined only after first deciding whether attorney fees are appropriate). 
73
 Id. at 1323 (citing Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 339 F.3d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
74
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d, at 1323–24 (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1460 




 Id. at 1324 (citing Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs, AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
77
 Id. (citing Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 549 F.3d 1381, 1387–88 (Fed. Cir. 
2008)). 
78
 Id. (citing Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailer Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)). 
79
 See Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1323–1328. 
80
 Id. at 1324. 
81
 The first five patents within the Patent Portfolio were assigned to Millennium; the next three 
patents were assigned to Eon-Net.  Supra note 38. 
82
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d 1314 at 1324 (citing Exceptional Case Order, Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 143114, at *21–22). 
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pending cases, Medina and attorney Zimmerman discarded all documents related 
to the Patent Portfolio in 2003,
83
 though Zimmerman later asserted he only 
discarded documents that were publicly available or non-essential.
84
  Citing Eon-
Net’s undisputed “independent duty to preserve evidence during the ongoing 
lawsuits,”
85
 the court of appeals concluded “in light of Medina’s testimony, it was 




Eon-Net also asserted that its claim construction was reasonable.
87
  Despite 
having prevailed on their earlier appellate court case because the district court 
failed to allow Eon-Net to present infringement and claim construction 
arguments,
88
 Eon-Net “failed to offer a construction for any disputed claim terms, 
lodged incomplete and misleading extrinsic evidence with the court, and 
submitted declarations that contradicted earlier deposition testimony by the 
declarants.”
89
  Eon-Net contended that the claim terms did not require 
construction because the district court was not obligated to construe each claim 
term.
90




As further evidence of misconduct, the district court noted that “Eon-Net and 
Medina had a ‘cavalier attitude’ towards the ‘patent litigation process as a 
whole.’”
92
  The district court cited an interrogatory response from a different case 
involving the Patent Portfolio in which Medina asserted “the skill in the art 
required is that sufficient to converse meaningfully with Mitchell Medina,”
93
 an 
assertion the appellate court characterized as “snide.”
94
  The district court also 
                                                                                                                                                              
83
 Id. (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *24–26). 
84
 Id. (citing Brief for Plaintiff/Sanctioned Party-Appellant Eon-Net LP and Sanctioned Parties-
Appellants Zimmerman & Levi, L.L.P. and Jean-Marc Zimmerman at 52, Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d 
1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2009–1308), 2010 WL 5558498). 
85
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1325 (citing Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1575 




 Id. at 1324. 
88
 Id. at 1325 (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *34). 
89
 Id. (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *36–37). 
90
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1325 (citing O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 




 Id. (quoting Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *43–44). 
93
 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at 
*44). 
94
 Id.  Fully appreciating the hypocrisy of this statement, the author suggests avoiding referring to 
oneself in the third person. 
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cited deposition testimony in which Medina indicated he was “so sick of this 
stuff, especially this haggling over stupidities and trivialities which is the name of 
the game in litigation.”
95
  Though Eon-Net asserted the interrogatory was a 
“draft,” the interrogatory was signed by attorney Zimmerman, was not amended, 
was not withdrawn, and was not identified as mistakenly served.
96
  Moreover, 
Eon-Net failed to address Medina’s deposition testimony.
97
  The court of appeals 




2. Objectively Baseless Litigation in Bad Faith 
The court of appeals began its examination of the district court finding of 
baseless infringement allegations by reexamining claim construction.
99
  Alluding 
to its earlier discussion of claim construction,
100
 the court reaffirmed “the written 
description clearly refutes Eon-Net's claim construction . . . .”
101
  The court 
contrasted the instant case with iLOR v. Google,
102
 in which a patent’s written 
description did not objectively refute the patentee’s claim construction.
103
  The 
court concluded its analysis of claim construction by addressing Eon-Net’s 
observation that the court previously stated in dicta “that one portion of the 
written description supported Eon-Net's construction because it discloses that the 
hardware for inputting document information can include devices other than a 
scanner.”
104
  The court of appeals stated that not only was their dicta clearly 
refuted by repeated and express definitions within the written description, but also 
that the same “opinion expressly le[ft] open the possibility that, after a full claim 
construction analysis, the district court could conclude that Eon-Net's claim 
                                                                                                                                                              
95
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1325 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *43–44). 
96








 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1320–23; see also supra Part III.A. 
101
 Id. at 1326. 
102
 iLOR v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
103
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1326 (citing iLOR, 631 F.3d at 1378–79) (reversing the lower court’s 
finding “that the patentee’s claim construction was objectively baseless where ‘[o]n its face, the 
claim language does not preclude the patentee's construction,’ the written description failed to 
‘clearly refute the patentee's construction,’ and the patentee could reasonably argue that the 
prosecution history did not preclude its construction.”) 
104
 Id. (citing Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 249 Fed. Appx. 189, 196 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
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The court then turned to the district court’s finding “that Eon-Net filed the 
lawsuit in bad faith and for an improper purpose.”
106
  Eon-Net argued that the 
purpose of the suit was to obtain licensing revenue, and that this constitutes a 
proper purpose.
107
  However, the district court indicated Eon-Net’s case “had 
‘indicia of extortion’ because it was part of Eon-Net's history of filing nearly 
identical patent infringement complaints against a plethora of diverse defendants, 
where Eon-Net followed each filing with a demand for a quick settlement at a 
price far lower than the cost to defend the litigation.”
108
  The appellate court 
analysis of the district court finding of filing multiple similar patent infringement 
complaints was brief: the appellate court observed the Patent Portfolio was the 
basis for “over 100 lawsuits against a number of diverse defendants . . . .”
109
 
Turning to the district court finding of bad faith, the court of appeals found 
bad faith supported by Eon-Net “exploiting the high cost to defend complex 
litigation to extract a nuisance value settlement from Flagstar.”
110
  Here, the 
“nuisance value settlement” followed a schedule: “$25,000 for sales less than 
$3,000,000; $50,000 for sales between $3,000,000 and $20,000,000; and $75,000 
for sales between $20,000,000 and $100,000,000.”
111
  This settlement offer was 
“lower than the cost of litigation, a demand to which most defendants apparently 
have agreed."
112
  In the instant case, the defendant’s cost of litigation through the 
claim construction phase was over $600,000.
113
  Compared to Eon-Net’s 
settlement schedule range of $25,000 to $75,000, it is apparent why the other 100 
accused patent infringers would choose to settle.
114
  This settlement schedule 
                                                                                                                                                              
105
 Id. (citation omitted). 
106
 Id. (citing Eon-Net III, No. C05-2129RSM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *38–39 (W.D. 
Wash. Jan. 4, 2010) (order granting motion for fees and costs)). 
107
 Id. at 1324. 
108
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d, at 1326. 
109




 Id. (citing Eon-Net, L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 609, 612–13 (W.D. Wash. 2006) 
(order granting Rule 11 sanctions)). 
112
 Id. (quoting Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *38).  According to this schedule, a 
settlement of $25,000 may comprise a significant percentage of a company’s annual sales, e.g., 
$25,000 / $100,000 annual sales = 25%; however for companies with annual sales greater than 
$3,000,000, the settlement is always less than 2% of annual sales: $25,000 / $3,000,000 = 0.83%; 
$50,000 / $3,000,000 = 1.67%; $75,000 / $20,000,000 = 0.375%. 
113
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1327 (citing, Eon-Net III, No. C05-2129RSM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
58784, at *8–11 (W.D. Wash. May 17, 2010) (supplemental order granting fees and costs)). 
114
 See id. 
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“effectively ensured that Eon-Net's baseless infringement allegations remained 




In addition to the high cost of claim construction, the court noted Eon-Net was 
in an advantageous offensive position “to impose disproportionate discovery 
costs” on accused infringers.
116
  Due to local discovery rules and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, “it is not uncommon for an accused infringer to produce 
millions of pages of documents” at the expense of the producing party.
117
  The 
court pointed out that the $600,000 expended in the case at hand did not include 
discovery unrelated to claim construction, and that full discovery would have 
“substantially increased” this cost.
118
 
The court also noted Eon-Net was in an advantageous defensive position 
afforded by its status as a non-practicing entity.
119
  On Medina’s own admission, 
Eon-Net and Millennium “evolved into patent enforcement companies which are 
involved in the business of litigation . . . .”
120
  Due to the limited nature of Eon-
Net’s business activities, it was immune to business-related counterclaims arising 
from patent infringement, antitrust, or unfair competition.
121
  At no time did Eon-
Net risk losing “patent protection over a product or process,” instead risking only 
licensing revenue due to invalid or narrowly construed patents, a risk mitigated by 
the high cost of litigating claim construction, the disproportionate cost of 
discovery, and the comparatively low cost outlined by the settlement schedule.
122
  




C. Rule 11 Sanctions 
Applying Ninth Circuit law, Rule 11 sanctions require two conditions: the 
complaint must be objectively “legally or factually baseless,” and the attorney 
must have “failed to conduct a reasonable and competent inquiry before filing the 
                                                                                                                                                              
115
 Id. at 1327. 
116
 See id. 
117
 Id. (citing Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978)). 
118
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1327. 
119
 See id. 
120
 Id. at 1324 (citing Eon-Net III, No. C05-2129RSM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *21–22 
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 4, 2010) (order granting motion for fees and costs)). 
121
 Id. at 1327–28. 
122
 See id.   
123
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1328. 
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  The court of appeals again alluded to its claim construction 
analysis to satisfy the first condition, finding Eon-Net’s infringement allegations 
to be legally baseless.
125
 
Turning to the second condition, the court of appeals evaluated the 
reasonability of Eon-Net’s pre-suit investigation.
126
  Eon-Net had examined 
portions of Flagstar’s website and concluded the website infringed the ‘697 
patent, asserting this constituted a reasonable pre-suit investigation.
127
  The court 
of appeals disagreed, stating Eon-Net was also required “to perform an objective 
evaluation of the claim terms when reading those terms on the accused device.”
128
  
The court of appeals quoted the district court’s finding that “[t]he specification 
exposes the frivolity of Eon-Net’s claim construction position,” a position that 
“borders on the illogical . . . .”
129
  Unpersuaded that the district court abused its 
discretion, the court of appeals upheld the Rule 11 sanctions.
130
 
The court of appeals concluded by finding Eon-Net’s remaining arguments 
without merit.
131
  In all, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court’s claim construction,
132
 the § 285 exceptional case finding,
133




IV. EON-NET ANALYSIS 
 On first impression, Eon-Net serves as a cautionary tale for NPEs.  
However, even a harshly punitive rebuke is instructive: in enumerating the basis 
for awarding attorney fees, the opinion of the court of appeals outlines the 
minimal effort required to avoid having to pay attorney fees and costs under § 285 
and Rule 11.   
                                                                                                                                                              
124
 Id. at 1328 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 




 Id. at 1328–29. 
127
 See id. (citing Eon-Net I, 249 Fed. Appx 189, 196 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
128
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1329 (citing Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 
1300–01 (Fed. Cir. 2004); S. Bravo Sys., Inc. v. Containment Techs. Corp., 96 F.3d 1372, 1375 
(Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
129
 Id. at 1329 (quoting Eon-Net, L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 609, 616–17 (W.D. 






 Id. at 1323. 
133
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1328. 
134
 Id. at 1329.  Because the court of appeals affirmed the district court, it simultaneously denied 
Eon-Net’s request to reassign the case to a different district judge in a different judicial district.  
Id. at 1320 n.2. 
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 Eon-Net listed four components supporting the § 285 exceptional case 
finding: “Eon-Net's pursuit of baseless infringement claims, Eon-Net's improper 
purpose of bringing the lawsuit against Flagstar to obtain a nuisance value 
settlement, Eon-Net's destruction of evidence, and Eon-Net's offensive litigation 
tactics.”
135
  Similarly, Rule 11 sanctions require a finding “that the complaint is 
legally or factually baseless from an objective perspective and that the attorney 




A. Reasonable Pre-Suit Investigation 
In the instant case, Rule 11 sanctions resulted from Eon-Net’s failure to 
conduct a reasonable pre-suit investigation, which turned on Eon-Net’s failure “to 
perform an objective evaluation of the claim terms.”
137
 At first blush, this 
argument may seem circular: the court of appeals sustained Rule 11 sanctions 
because of its claim construction, but claim construction could only be evaluated 
by bringing its case to court.  However, claim construction is routinely completed 
by patentees considering filing infringement actions, and as demonstrated here, is 
required in any reasonable pre-suit patent infringement investigation.   
For Eon-Net, it seems Rule 11 sanctions were inevitable.  Eon-Net’s 
specification was so different from the accused infringer’s practices that the 
district court characterized Eon-Net’s claim construction as frivolous and 
illogical.
138
  The district court initially assessed Rule 11 sanctions and the 
appellate court remanded to allow Eon-Net to present claim construction 
arguments.  The district court then assessed Rule 11 sanctions and added § 285 
fees and costs, and the appellate court upheld this ruling.
139
  Though usually self-
                                                                                                                                                              
135
 See Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1320.  See also supra Part III.B.2 (discussing Eon-Net’s pursuit of 
baseless infringement claims); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing Eon-Net’s destruction of 
evidence). 
136
 Id. at 1328 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 
at 1127 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
137
 Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1329 (citing Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 
1300–01 (Fed. Cir. 2004); S. Bravo Sys., Inc. v. Containment Techs. Corp., 96 F.3d 1372, 1375 
(Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
138
 Id. at 1329 (quoting Order on Sanctions Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 239 F.R.D. at 617). 
139
 Id. at 1320–23; supra Parts II-III.   Though Rule 11 sanctions seem to have been inevitable, had 
Eon-Net refrained from appealing the original district court’s claim construction and Rule 11 
sanctions, Flagstar would not have had opportunity to move under § 285 and the district court 
would not have had opportunity to grant § 285 costs and fees “for litigating the case following 
remand.”  Id. at 1320 (citing Eon-Net, L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., No. C05-2129RSM, Eon-Net 
III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58784, at *24 (D. Wash. May 17, 2010)).  
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evident, this underscores the importance of performing a reasonable pre-suit claim 
construction. 
B. Destruction of Evidence 
As expected, a party may avoid destruction of evidence by implementing a 
document retention policy, executing the “independent duty to preserve evidence 
during the ongoing lawsuits.”
140
  Moreover, a company executive may garner 
favor by avoiding glib testimony that the company has “adopted a document 
retention policy which is that [it doesn't] retain any documents . . . ."
141
  Though 
the court of appeals did not discuss spoliation of evidence,
142
 the court was unable 
to determine whether Eon-Net attorney Zimmerman only “discarded publicly 
available documents and nonessential documents” as claimed,
143
 and could not 
conclude that Eon-Net had observed their duty.
144
  
C. Offensive Litigation Practices 
Similarly, Eon-Net’s offensive litigation practices should be avoided.  At a 
minimum, care should be taken to avoid “lodg[ing] incomplete and misleading 
extrinsic evidence with the court, and submitt[ing] declarations that contradict[] 
earlier deposition testimony by the declarants.”
145
  Additionally, when trying a 
case remanded specifically to afford the opportunity to argue claim construction, 
it is important to offer a construction for any disputed claim terms.  Of course, a 




                                                                                                                                                              
140
 Id. at 1325 (citing Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
141
 Id. at 1324 (citing Eon-Net, L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., No. C05-2129RSM, Eon-Net III, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *21–22).  
142
  “Spoliation of evidence refers to the ‘act of damaging evidence.’” Michael A. Zuckerman, Yes, 
I Destroyed The Evidence – Sue Me? Intentional Spoliation of Evidence in Illinois, 27 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 235, 236 (2009).  “The word ‘spoliation’ is derived from the 
Latin phrase omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorum, which means ‘all things are presumed 
against a despoilor or wrongdoer.’” Id. at n.17 (citing Lawrence Solum & Stephen Marzen, Truth 
and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1087 
(1987)).  
143
 Eon-Net, 653 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Brief for Appellant at 52).  
144
 Id. at 1325. 
145
 Id. (citing Exceptional Case Order, Eon-Net, L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., No. C05-
2129RSM, Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *36–37). 
146
 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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D. Indicia of Extortion 
Unlike destruction of evidence and offensive litigation, the threshold for 
“indicia of extortion” is not clearly defined.  However, the court of appeals listed 
two affirmative actions taken by Eon-Net: filing a series of “nearly identical 
patent infringement complaints against a plethora of diverse defendants,” and 
following each filing with a settlement demand “at a price far lower than the cost 
to defend the litigation . . . .”
147
  To avoid the former indication, patent litigants 
should make reasonable efforts to identify potential infringers with more 
certainty.  To avoid the latter indication, patent litigants should follow the initial 
infringement suit filing with a demand higher than Eon-Net’s schedule: while this 
may increase the likelihood that a company may not settle before claim 
construction, it would increase the value of the cases that settled, and Eon-Net 
suggests a court would be less likely to find “indicia of extortion.”
148
 
Also listed among “indicia of extortion” are the offensive and defensive 
advantages afforded to Eon-Net by virtue of its status as a non-practicing entity.  
Offensively, Eon-Net is in a position to use discovery rules to impose 
disproportionate discovery costs on an accused patent infringer.  Defensively, 
Eon-Net undertook minimal risk by suing: “As a non-practicing entity, Eon-Net 
was generally immune to counterclaims for patent infringement, antitrust, or 
unfair competition because it did not engage in business activities that would 
potentially give rise to those claims.”
149
  Unfortunately for everyone involved, 
these are some of the characteristics endemic to NPEs, and little can be done to 
mitigate them. 
V. CURTAILING THE NPE 
A. Three-Pronged Attack 
In order to constrain the activities of the NPE, Eon-Net provides for § 285 and 
Rule 11 sanctions.  In addition, other courts and the legislature have begun to 
address some of the tactical advantages of NPEs.  Two of the most significant 
                                                                                                                                                              
147
 Eon-Net, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326 (citing Exceptional Case Order, Eon-Net, L.P. v. Flagstar 
Bancorp, Inc., No. C05-2129RSM, Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *36–37). 
148
 Cf. Eon-Net, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Eon-Net supports the proposition that a low settlement 
schedule can be counted among “indicia of extortion”; it follows that the same court would be less 
likely to fault a more expensive settlement schedule). 
149
 Id. at 1327.  The court of appeals expounded, stating “while Eon-Net risked licensing revenue 
should its patents be found invalid or if a court narrowly construed the patents' claims to exclude 
valuable targets, Eon-Net did not face any business risk resulting from the loss of patent protection 
over a product or process. Its patents protected only settlement receipts, not its own products.”  Id. 
at 1327–28. 
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efforts are the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. MercExchange,
150
 and the 
enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.
151
 
1. Sanctions after Eon-Net 
Other than demonstrating a willingness to apply Rule 11 and § 285, Eon-Net 
does little to deter other NPEs from a careful execution of Eon-Net’s otherwise 
successful get-rich-quick scheme.  The scheme is the classic modus operandi of 
NPEs: allocate a few related patents to a non-practicing company, identify 
companies likely to have infringed on the patents, file an infringement suit, and 
follow the suit with an offer for settlement.  Indeed, patents within the Patent 
Portfolio assigned to Millennium were used to extract settlements in “six or seven 
dozen cases” of alleged patent infringement before being declared invalid,
152
 and 
there appears to be no suggestion of attorney discipline.
153
  Just as businesses may 
view defending against NPE patent infringement suits as a cost of doing business, 
so may NPEs view Rule 11 and § 285 as a cost of doing business.  The full 
judgment against Eon-Net of $631,135.18 may be recouped in twenty-five 
$25,000 settlements or nine $75,000 settlements.  If the Millennium patents 
extracted six dozen settlements at a median value of $50,000 before being 
declared invalid, this would result in a windfall of $3,600,000.
154
 
Not only do NPEs have a clear financial motivation to pursue potential patent 
infringers, but potential infringers also have a clear financial motivation to pay for 
a patent license.  Given the choice between paying for a patent license and 
defending against infringement, “we can expect the potential infringer to be 
willing to pay a licensing fee equal to or less than the total expected cost under the 
                                                                                                                                                              
150
 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
151
 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284–341 (codified as 
35 U.S.C. passim). 
152
 Glory Licensing LLC v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., No. 09-4252, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51888 at *3 
n.1 (D. N.J. May 16, 2011) (citing April 25, 2011 Tr. at 37:12-37:21). 
153
  New Jersey Judiciary records do not indicate Eon-Net attorney Jean-Marc Zimmerman has 
ever been disciplined (http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/oae/discipline.htm), though it appears that 
Zimmerman was declared ineligible to practice law from October 26, 2009 (see Notice to the Bar 
Re: IOLTA Ineligible List, available at 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/2009/n091023a.pdf) to September 27, 2010 (see Attorneys 
Reinstated from Ineligible List, available at 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/2011/n110921b.pdf) for an unspecified violation of New 
Jersey rules on Income on Non-Interest Bearing Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA) Fund (see 
Income on Non-Interest Bearing Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA) Fund, available at 
http://www.ioltanj.org/lwr_courtrules.html). 
154
 The median (middle value) of $25,000, $50,000, and $75,000 is $50,000; $50,000 x 6 x 12 = 
$3,600,000. 
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    The cost of litigation is comprised of “(1) the expected cost 
of court-awarded damages; (2) the expected cost of having to comply with a 
permanent injunction, whether through a design-around, licensing, or simple 
termination of infringing activity; and (3) the expected cost of litigation itself, 
including attorney fees and court costs.”
156
   
Because damages and permanent injunctions generally may not precede a 
determination of infringement, a relatively weak patent suit will mitigate the 
exposure associated with damages or permanent injunction.
157
  For patent suits in 
general, “most litigation costs are apparently incurred by the end of discovery,” so 
the cost of litigation will dominate the patent infringement exposure 
calculation.
158
  Because litigation costs in defending against patent infringement 
are “generally at least on the order of $1 million,”
159
 a potential infringer has 
substantial motivation to settle even a weak patent suit.  Of course, for stronger 
allegations of patent infringement, the alleged infringer is under the additional 
financial pressure applied by the potential cost of damages or a permanent 
injunction. 
2. Injunctions After eBay v. MercExchange 
Eon-Net v. Flagstar was notable for its atypical award of attorney fees and 
costs to the defendant.  More conventionally, attorney fees are available as a 
remedy for patent infringement, along with compensatory and equitable relief.
160
  
For the purposes of the current NPE discussion, this section focuses on recent 
changes in equitable relief and their chilling effect on NPE lawsuits. 
Equitable relief for patent infringement includes preliminary and permanent 
injunctions.
161
  A court may issue a preliminary injunction to “prevent possible 
                                                                                                                                                              
155
 John M. Golden, SYMPOSIUM: Frontiers of Intellectual Property: Patent Reform 
Commentary: "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2126 (2007).  (this 
“assum[es] that transaction costs associated with licensing can be treated as negligible”).  Id. 
156
  Id. 
157
  Id. at 2127–28. 
158
  Id. at 2128 (citing Law Practice Mgmt. Comm., Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n, Report of 
the Economic Survey 2005, at 22 (2005)). 
159
  Id. at 2128 & n.60.  Compared against Eon-Net’s settlement schedule of $25,000-$75,000 
amounts to 2.5-7.5% of $1,000,000, which lends support to the appellate court characterization of 
such a schedule as a “nuisance value settlement.”  See Eon-Net, 653 F.3d 1314, 1327; supra note 
49 and accompanying text.  However, compared to the initial award of $141,984.70, $75,000 is 
52.8%.  
160
 SHELDON W. HALPERN, CRAIG ALLEN NARD & KENNETH L. PORT, FUNDAMENTALS OF UNITED 
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ongoing infringement of a patent prior to a finding of infringement,”
162
 and until 
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
163
 a permanent injunction usually followed a 
finding of infringement.
164
  While “an injunction may be of little or no value to a 
plaintiff whose patented technology is long outdated at the conclusion of a 
lengthy trial,”
165
 injunctions could be “extremely valuable, even for their bullying 
power alone.”
166
  Such threats can significantly increase settlement offers, 
especially for an NPE filing a series of lawsuits intended to induce quick 
settlements. 
Between the 1983 case Smith International, Inc., v. Hughes Tool Co.
167
 and 
the 2006 eBay case,
168
 “the Federal Circuit presumptively granted equitable relief 
in patent cases.”
169
  During this time, “courts' preference for granting equitable 
relief amounted to a great deal of leverage for plaintiffs when negotiating 
licensing agreements and one-time settlement payments with alleged 
infringers.”
170
  One such case resulted in a windfall judgment: faced with an 
injunction from the manufacture and sale of Blackberry® devices, defendant 




The courts’ presumption of equitable relief met its end with the eBay decision.  
The district court initially found eBay to be infringing MercExchange’s business 
method patent “for an electronic marketplace designed to foster commercial 
transactions between private individuals through a common trusted entity.”
172
  
                                                                                                                                                              
162
 Id. at 286 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994)). 
163
 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
164
 HALPERN, NARD & PORT, supra note 160, at 286.  “After finding infringement, a court 
generally grants a permanent injunction unless there is a sufficient countervailing reason.”  Id. 
(citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).  
165
 Damon C. Andrews, Article: Why Patentees Litigate, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 219, 
239 (2011).  
166
 Id. at 240 (citing Mark A. Lemley, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 783, 798 (2007)).  “The threat that a patent holder will obtain an injunction that will 
force the downstream producer to pull its product from the market can be very powerful. These 
threats can greatly affect licensing negotiations, especially in cases where the injunction is based 
on a patent covering one small component of a complex product.”  Id. n.116  
167
 718 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
168
 eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
169
 Andrews, supra note 165, at 239.  “It is the general rule that an injunction will issue when 
infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound reason for denying it.”  Id. n.110 (quoting 
Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). 
170
 Id. at 240 (citing Lily Lim & Sara E. Craven, Symposium Review: Injunctions Enjoined; 




 Id. (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 390). 
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While the district court awarded damages, it denied MercExchange’s request for a 
permanent injunction.
173
  On appeal, the Federal Circuit granted an injunction, 
“applying its ‘general rule’ that ‘a permanent injunction will issue once 
infringement and validity have been adjudged.’”
174
  Dissatisfied by the 
application of a “general rule” to a grant of an injunction, the Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit’s injunction, “holding that prevailing 
patent owners must satisfy a four-factor test before a court can grant injunctive 
relief.”
175
  In a notable concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy observed that “firms 
have shifted from a regime in which patents were used ‘as a basis for producing 
and selling goods’ to one in which patents are primarily ‘bargaining tool[s] [used] 
to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the 
patent.’”
176
   
In the five years following eBay, many commentators predicted patent holders 
would find it more difficult to obtain injunctions, often alluding to Justice 
                                                                                                                                                              
173
 Id. (citing MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003)). 
174
 Andrews, supra note 165, at 241 (citing MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
175
 Id. (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 391).   As a prerequisite for granting an injunction, the four factors 
set out in eBay are as follows: 
(1) [T]hat [the plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury;  
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury;  
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and  
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction. 
eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.  The four eBay factors are quite similar to the four factors set out by the 
1983 case of Smith International, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co.: 
First, whether the party seeking the injunction (the movant) has sufficiently 
established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits . . . .  Second, 
whether the movant would suffer irreparable harm if an injunction was not 
granted . . . .  Third, whether a balance of hardships tips in the movant’s favor . . 
. .  The final consideration is whether an injunction will impair the public 
interest. 
HALPERN, NARD & PORT, supra note 160, at 286–87.  The four eBay factors are 
substantially similar to the four factors prescribed by Smith v. Hughes, suggesting that the 
Supreme Court was intentionally guiding lower courts away from application of a general 
rule.  
176
 Andrews, supra note 165, at 241 (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).  One 
commentator applied Kennedy’s concurrence to NPEs, observing "Justice Kennedy's concurrence 
struck a far different tone, focusing in particular on why nonpracticing patentees should be refused 
injunctions."  Id. n.125 (quoting Jaideep Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing 
Patentees After eBay v. MercExchange, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 26, 32 (2009)). 
23
Hjelle: Identifying Indicia of Extortion in Patent Troll Cases: Eon-Net L
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012





  Data suggest injunctions remain widely 
available: “district courts have awarded permanent injunctions in more than 
seventy-five percent of the 164 patent cases since eBay.”
178
  However, several 
courts focus on whether lawsuit parties are in direct competition: injunctions were 
“granted in twenty-four of twenty-six cases in which the parties were found to 
compete directly,” and “injunctions were denied in five of nine cases in which the 
parties were found to not compete directly.”
179
  Several of the cases denying 
injunctions “have hinged on the fact that the plaintiff was a non-practicing 
entity.”
180
  As courts continue to interpret Kennedy’s concurrence to offer 
injunctive relief primarily to direct competitors, and as additional court decisions 
explicitly grant or deny injunctive relief based on a party’s status as an NPE, eBay 
will continue to have a chilling effect on the viability of NPE lawsuits.
181
 
3. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act was signed into law by President 
Barack Obama on September 16, 2011.
182
  Of the many patent system changes 
within the law,
183
 NPEs will be most affected by the new limitation on joinder of 
parties. 
                                                                                                                                                              
177
 Id. (citing Nina Medlock et al., The Non-Practicing Patentee's Right to a Permanent Injunction 
Restraining Patent Infringement: Going Once, Going Twice, Gone?, 18 No. 9 INTELL. PROP. & 
TECH. L.J., Sept. 2006, at 1, 2–3; Jaideep Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing 
Patentees after eBay v. MercExchange, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 26, 32 (2009)). 
178
 Id. at 242 (citing Post-eBay Permanent Injunction Rulings by District Courts to 1-16-2011, 
PATSTATS.ORG (Jan. 30, 2011), http://www.patstats.org/Patstats2.html).  See also Post-eBay 
Permanent Injunction Rulings in Patent Cases to 12-4-11, PATSTATS.ORG (Mar. 5, 2012), 
http://www.patstats.org/Injunction_rulings_post-eBay_to_12-04-2011.post.xls (data indicates 
exactly 150 injunctions granted and 50 denied, current as of Dec. 4, 2011). 
179
 Id. nn. 130–31. (citing Douglas Ellis et al., The Economic Implications (and Uncertainties) of 
Obtaining Permanent Injunctive Relief After eBay v. MercExchange, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 437, 442–
44 (2008)). 
180
 Id. at 243 (citing z4 Techs, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex. 
2006)). 
181
 As long as litigation costs predominate legal exposure in defending against patent infringement, 
the effect of equitable remedies will remain limited.   See John M. Golden, SYMPOSIUM: 
Frontiers of Intellectual Property: Commentary: "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 2111, 2130 (2007). 
182
 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, supra note 151. 
183
 See, e.g., Kenneth E. Levitt, Patent Reform Becomes Law: The Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act, DORSEY, Sept. 14, 2011, available at http://www.dorsey.com/eu_ip_leahysmith_91411/.  The 
law “[m]oves the United States from a ‘first-to-invent’ to a ‘first-inventor-to-file’ system . . . ; 
[b]roadens the scope and definitions of prior art; [e]xpands the “prior user” defense to patent 
litigation . . . ; and [c]reates new procedures for challenging the validity of patents . . . .”  Id.  
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While rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already allows joinder 
of parties if the action arises out of the same transaction or occurrence and has a 
common question of law or fact,
184
 the new law prevents defendants from being 
joined “based solely on allegations that they infringed the patent(s) at issue.”
185
  
While plaintiffs may still join defendants handling a common product, plaintiffs 
may not “join defendants selling or distributing different products based only on 




NPEs were afforded several tactical advantages by the previous, more 
expansive interpretation of permissive joinder.  NPEs were able to pay a single 
filing fee to join “dozens of defendants in the same suit” in a remote, plaintiff-
friendly forum.
187
  As a result, defendants were forced to choose between 
expensive litigation in an unfriendly forum and a settlement “on unfavorable 
terms.”
188
  When deciding venue from among the plaintiff’s location and the 
locations of defendants throughout the country, “courts often conclude that the 
forum selected by the plaintiff is just as convenient to all parties.”
189
  However, 
for a single defendant, a court may be more likely to choose the defendant’s 




B. Analysis of Attack on NPEs 
Any remedy to NPE abuses must overcome three challenges: NPE actions are 
generally legal,
191
 NPEs are inherently difficult to categorize,
192
 and NPEs have 
                                                                                                                                                              
184
 FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A–B) (stating that defendants may be joined if “(A) any right to relief 
is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the 
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law 
or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.”). 
185
 Robert C. Van Arnam, The Joinder Provision in the Patent Reform Act: Leveling the Playing 
Field Against Multi-Defendant NPE Suits, MARTINDALE.COM, Sept. 20, 2011, available at 
http://www.martindale.com/retail-trade/article_Williams-Mullen_1344570.htm.  
186
 Id.  Limitations to joinder were modified in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: “For 
purposes of this subsection, accused infringers may not be joined in one action as defendants or 
counterclaim defendants, or have their actions consolidated for trial, based solely on allegations 
that they each have infringed the patent or patents in suit.” Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
supra note 151, sec. 19 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 299(b)). 
187








 See, e.g., Travis Burchart, Your Good Will Hunting Moment: Arguing for the Non-Practicing 
Entity or Against the Patent Troll, LEXISNEXIS PATENT LAW COMMUNITY BLOG (Aug. 22, 2011, 
7:57:00 AM), 
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strong financial motivation to continue abusive practices.
193
  These cases and 
legislation strike at the heart of all three NPE challenges. 
Somewhere between permissible legal practices and outright extortion, Eon-
Net circumscribes a set of corporate and legal circumstances sufficient for Rule 11 
sanctions and § 285 costs and fees.  While Eon-Net significantly constrains the 
legal activities available to NPEs, unfortunately it stops short of making these 
“indicia of extortion” alone a sufficient ground for sanctions. 
Similarly, eBay and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act define and 
constrain NPEs, but with limited effect: cases after eBay attempt to limit 
injunctions to directly competing firms,
194
 but data show that not all non-
competing firms were denied injunctions.  The America Invents Act excises the 
common NPE practice of joining unrelated defendants in a disadvantageous 
jurisdiction,
195
 and while requiring NPEs to file separate cases will increase their 
cost, it may not overcome the financial motivation of NPEs.
196
 
These effects of Eon-Net, eBay, and the America Invents Act are at variance 
with a strict constructionist view of the Constitution: because the Framers never 
distinguished NPEs from practicing or inventing entities, “many scholars argue 
that the behavior of patent trolls is perfectly within the realm contemplated by 
Congress throughout the development of U.S. intellectual property law.”
197
  
Moreover, heraldic proponents of NPEs tout the capital provided to inventors by 
NPE-purchased patents.
198
   
However, when an NPE seeks to extract money through litigation or an in 
terrorem settlement,
199
 it neither encourages invention nor adds to the public 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/patentlaw/blogs/patentlawblog/archive/2011/08/22/your-
good-will-hunting-moment_3a00_-arguing-for-the-non_2d00_practicing-entity-or-against-the-
patent-troll.aspx (“Patents are valuable assets/property and the enforcement of rights is a 
legitimate activity.”). 
192
 See supra Part I.A. 
193
 See supra notes 152 and accompanying text. 
194
 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.  The data suggests injunctions for non-competing 
firms are less likely following eBay, but not strictly excluded. 
195 
See supra note 190 and accompanying text.  As with non-competing firms, this constraint helps 
define NPEs by their abusive practices. 
196
 See supra notes 152 and accompanying text. 
197
 Robin M. Davis, Note: Failed Attempts to Dwarf the Patent Trolls: Permanent Injunctions in 
Patent Infringement Cases Under the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005 and eBay v. 
MercExchange, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 431, 433 (2008). 
198
 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
199
 Cf. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps to 
explain how ordinary pleading rules seek to prevent settlement costs from being increased by an in 
terrorem threat of litigation: “But to the extent that it permits a plaintiff with a largely groundless 
26
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  By reserving judicial resources for non-sanctionable cases
201
 and by 
retaining capital within entities actively engaged in production or research and 
development, Eon-Net, eBay, and the America Invents Act move us closer to 
accomplishing our Constitutional goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science 




Eon-Net is one of the most recent examples of possible consequences of 
egregious conduct by an NPE.  To NPEs, Eon-Net adds definition to what may be 
considered “indicia of extortion.”  To all legal practitioners, Eon-Net adds 
definition to the set of litigation misconduct sufficient for Rule 11 sanctions and § 
285 costs and fees.  Similarly, eBay and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
constrain the scope of litigation available to NPEs.  Taken together, NPE activity 
will be hamstrung by limitations to joinder, permanent injunctions, and the threat 
of Rule 11 sanctions and § 285 costs and fees. 
While Eon-Net is instructive, its practical effect will remain limited by the 
strong financial incentives for NPEs.  Without a systematic effort to mitigate the 
strong financial incentive and apparently infrequent consequences to the practices 




                                                                                                                                                              
claim to simply take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing 
an in terrorem increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonably founded hope that the 
process will reveal relevant evidence, it is a social cost rather than a benefit.). 
200
 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
201
 As a possible alternative, "energy might be better directed to devising alternatives or 
improvements to today's costly court proceedings - such as better initial screening of patents by 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, more effective reexamination proceedings, or a new brand 
of administrative ‘opposition’ proceedings."  Golden, supra note 181, at 2130 (citing Joseph 
Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't 
Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 961–64 (2004); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents 
Survive in the Market and How Should We Change? - The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 
EMORY L.J. 61, 122 (2006)). 
202
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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